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Abstract
This paper studies the value of more precise signals on agent performance
in an optimal contracting model with endogenous effort. With limited liability,
the agent’s wage is increasing in output only if output exceeds a threshold, else
it is zero regardless of output. If the threshold is sufficiently high, the agent
only beats it, and is rewarded for increasing output through greater effort, if
there is a high noise realization. Thus, a fall in output volatility reduces effort
incentives – information and effort are substitutes – offsetting the standard effect
that improved information lowers the cost of compensation. We derive conditions
relating the incentive effect to the underlying parameters of the agency problem.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contributions of Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979), the moral haz-
ard literature has shown that superior information on agent performance can improve
the principal’s payoff. This result has implications for many contracting applications,
such as compensation, financing, insurance, and regulation. However, information is
also costly. Thus, to determine whether the principal should invest in information, we
must analyze what its benefits depend on – in particular, relate them to the underly-
ing parameters of the agency problem. Doing so will identify the situations in which
information is most valuable, and thus its acquisition most justified.
Analyzing the benefits of information requires an optimal contracting approach.
Assuming a particular contracting form may lead to misleading results – for example,
when contracts are suboptimal, adding noise to the contract may be desirable, suggest-
ing that precision has strictly negative value. As is well-known, solving for the optimal
contract in a general setting is highly complex (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1983). We
consider the standard framework of risk neutrality and limited liability, originally an-
alyzed by Innes (1990) and widely used in a number of settings (e.g., Biais, Mariotti,
Rochet, and Villeneuve, 2010; Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006; DeMarzo and Fishman,
2007a, 2007b; DeMarzo and Sannikov, 2006). This framework allows for an optimal
contracting approach and involves the agent receiving a call option, as observed in
practice.1
We model the option contract as based on output and information as affecting
output volatility, but the model is virtually identical if the contract is instead based on
a separate performance signal and information affects the volatility of this signal. We
start by assuming a general output distribution and an endogenous implemented effort
level. An increase in information precision (fall in volatility), in the sense of a mean-
preserving spread of output, has two effects, each with a clear economic interpretation.
First, a fall in volatility reduces the value of the option and thus the expected wage:
the direct effect. Second, it changes the agent’s effort incentives: the incentive effect.
While the direction of the direct effect is unambiguous – the standard intuition that
information reduces the cost of contracting – the incentive effect can either be positive
or negative, i.e., effort and precision can be complements or substitutes. The heart
of this paper analyzes this incentive effect. Our most general result is to derive a
1While options are not the only instruments used in practice, Dittmann and Maug (2007) find that
the payoff structure provided by a CEO’s overall compensation package resembles an option.
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condition that determines the sign of this effect, and thus whether effort and precision
are complements (precision increases incentives) or substitutes (precision decreases
incentives). The condition is simple and easy to check, as we show with a simple
example.
We then consider the common case of output distributions with a location param-
eter, i.e., effort shifts the location of the distribution without affecting its shape, as
in the normal and uniform distributions. This allows us to relate the sign of the in-
centive effect to the strike price of the option. We show that the incentive effect is
positive if and only if the strike price is below a threshold, and negative otherwise.
The intuition is as follows. Since the wage is positive only if output exceeds the strike
price, increasing effort increases the wage only if output ends up higher than the strike
price – if output still ends up below, the agent receives zero, regardless of output and
thus his effort. Increasing precision moves probability mass from the tails towards the
center of the distribution. If the strike price is low, this change moves mass from below
to above the strike price, increasing the probability that output exceeds it. In simple
language, the agent thinks “If I work harder, I’ll get paid more unless I get so unlucky
that output falls below the target. Now that precision is higher, I’m unlikely to suffer
bad enough luck, so it’s worth it for me to work harder.” Thus, effort and precision
are complements, and so the principal’s benefit from increasing precision is even higher
than when focusing on the direct effect alone.
On the other hand, if the strike price is high, increasing precision shifts mass from
above to below the strike price, reducing the probability that output exceeds it. In
simple language, the agent thinks “The target is so high that, even if I did work, I
wouldn’t meet it unless I also got lucky. Now that precision is higher, I’m unlikely
to get lucky enough to meet the target, so there’s no point in working.” Thus, effort
and precision are substitutes, and so the principal’s benefit from increasing precision
is lower than when focusing on the direct effect alone. As a result, the net benefit of
precision may be insufficient to justify its cost.
Since the strike price is endogenous, we next relate the incentive effect to the un-
derlying parameters of the agency problem – specifically the cost function. In any
contracting setting, the effect of the cost function on the strength of incentives (here,
captured by the option’s delta and thus the strike price) depends on whether the im-
plemented effort level is fixed or endogenous. With endogenous effort, a less convex
cost of effort typically leads to the principal implementing a higher effort level and
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thus offering stronger incentives; with fixed effort, a lower cost of effort means that
weaker incentives are needed to implement the given effort level. We therefore analyze
both cases. Where effort is endogenous, the sign of the incentive effect depends on
the convexity of the cost function. If the cost function is sufficiently convex, inducing
effort is costly and so the principal implements a low effort level. As a result, the strike
price is high relative to the effort level, and so precision reduces incentives. This result
contrasts intuition that information should be more valuable when the agency problem
is strong. In addition, an analysis focusing only on the direct effect of precision, and
ignoring the incentive effect, would suggest that the value is highest when the option
is at-the-money – i.e., a moderate initial strike price and a moderate agency problem.
A fixed effort level arises with a binary effort space, which is often used for tractabil-
ity. In addition to being tractable, a fixed effort level is also realistic if the benefits of
effort are large relative to the costs, as with CEOs of large firms (Edmans and Gabaix,
2011), because the principal always wishes to implement full productive efficiency. The
sign of the incentive effect depends on the cost of effort: where the cost is high, the
principal must give the agent strong incentives to induce effort. These incentives are
provided by a low strike price, and so precision increases incentives.
It is limited liability, and not risk neutrality, that is key to our results. We show
that the incentive effect similarly depends on the strike price when the agent is risk-
averse. Regardless of whether the agent is risk-neutral or risk-averse, when there is
limited liability, the optimal contract pays the agent zero when output is below a
threshold. Thus, he is only rewarded for marginal increases in effort if output exceeds
the threshold, the probability of which depends on output volatility.
We also analyze the case in which the principal can renege on any pre-announced
level of precision after the agent has exerted effort. Then, there is no incentive effect
(the agent ignores the initial announcement when selecting effort) and so the principal
only considers the direct effect when choosing the final level of precision. Thus, her
benefit from increasing precision is higher ex ante than ex post if and only if the
incentive effect is positive. In this case, she may wish to commit to a high level
of precision ex ante. We also show that the level of precision chosen by the principal
generally differs from the socially optimal level, and may exceed it. This result suggests
that regulations to increase information disclosure may move us further from the social
optimum. In addition, if the agent had bargaining power and chose precision, he would
typically select a different level from the principal, so control rights matter for efficiency.
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Our results have a number of implications for compensation contracts. Most im-
portantly, they highlight that information may not improve incentives, contrary to
conventional wisdom that more precise signals make incentive provision easier. They
also identify the settings in which investing in information is optimal for the principal.
Using the fixed effort model as an example, when incentives are strong (weak) to begin
with, e.g., for CEOs (rank-and-file managers), an increase in precision increases (re-
duces) incentives. One way in which the principal can invest in information is to engage
in relative performance evaluation (“RPE”). There is very little evidence that RPE
is used for rank-and-file managers, and only modest evidence of its usage for CEOs.2
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) interpret this rarity as evidence that CEO contracts are in-
efficient. However, to evaluate this argument, we need to identify the settings in which
the value of information is smallest, and compare them to the cases in which RPE is
particularly absent in reality. That RPE is more common for CEOs than managers is
consistent with the above prediction.
In addition to the gains from precision, our analysis also studies the impact of exoge-
nous changes in precision, such as changes in stock market efficiency. For example, an
increase in volatility raises (lowers) the incentives of agents with out-of-the-money (in-
the-money) options. If firms recontract in response, CEOs with in-the-money options
should receive the highest increase in incentives.
As Innes (1990) showed, in addition to compensation, the model can also be ap-
plied to a financing setting where the agent (entrepreneur) raises financing from the
principal (investor), in which case the contract is risky debt, and the strike price rep-
resents its face value. Our model sheds light on the settings in which the investor’s
incentive to reduce output volatility is highest. As with investing in information, doing
so is potentially costly – implementing a risk management system is expensive, and
imposing covenants can stifle investment. An analysis based on the direct effect would
suggest that risk management is most valuable for firms at the bankruptcy threshold,
as then the value of debt is most sensitive to volatility. This is consistent with stan-
dard intuition that risk management incentives are increasing in loan size (up to the
bankruptcy threshold), because the lender has more at stake. This intuition is incom-
plete because it ignores the incentive effect. When the face value of debt is low, equity
is in-the-money and the incentive effect is positive. As a result, risk management raises
2While Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Murphy (1999) document almost no use, more recent
evidence by Albuquerque (2009), Gong, Li, and Shin (2011), and De Angelis and Grinstein (2017)
find evidence of RPE. See Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter (2017) for a review of the evidence on RPE.
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effort incentives, further increasing its value over and above the direct effect. Thus,
surprisingly, risk management may be more valuable for firms that are some distance
from bankruptcy, and when the investor has little debt at stake. Separately, the model
suggests that the entrepreneur’s initial wealth affects the value of precision. Where
wealth is low, the entrepreneur needs to raise debt with a high face value which, as is
known, reduces effort incentives. Our results suggest that increases in precision may
further exacerbate the incentive problems originating from low initial wealth, since the
incentive effect is then negative.
Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2013) also consider the effect on effort when analyzing
a specific form of increased precision – indexing stock and options – and similarly show
that indexation may weaken incentives. They use a quite different setting, reflecting
the different aims of each paper. Their goal is to calibrate real-life contracts, and so
they fix the implemented effort level, restrict the contract to comprising salary, stock,
and options, and hold stock constant when changing the contract to restore the agent’s
incentives upon indexation. They acknowledge that the actual savings from indexation
will be different if the principal recontracts optimally. Our primary goal is theoretical.
We take an optimal contracting approach, where the contract adjusts optimally to
changes in precision, and the implemented effort level is endogenous.
The interaction between effort and (mean-preserving) risk has been studied by other
papers. In Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), risk has no direct effect on effort (unlike in
our paper), but greater risk reduces the optimal pay-performance sensitivity and thus
incentives. In this sense, precision always increases effort, unlike in our paper. Gjesdal
(1982) shows that incentives can increase with a different type of risk – giving the agent
a stochastic contract where, for a given output level, the agent receives a lottery rather
than a wage. If the agent’s utility is non-separable in the wage and his action, higher
effort may directly reduce the agent’s risk aversion; giving him a lottery incentivizes
him to exert effort to reduce his aversion to the lottery. In our paper, a deterministic
contract is optimal (as is common in reality) and risk instead involves changing the
precision of the performance measure, allowing our model to apply to risk management
and monitoring. The channel through which risk affects effort is also very different.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The main results
are presented in Section 3, where we study the effects from increased signal precision
and relate the incentive effect to the underlying parameters of the agency problem.
Section 4 discusses applications and alternative modeling assumptions, and Section 5
6
concludes. The proofs are presented in Appendix A.
2 The model
We consider a standard principal-agent model with risk neutrality and limited liability,
as in Innes (1990). At time t = −1, the principal offers a contract to the agent. At
t = 0, the agent chooses effort e from a non-empty, compact subset of the real line E .
The agent’s cost of exerting effort e is C(e), where C(·) is continuous and increasing.
As is standard, effort can refer not only to working rather than shirking, but also
choosing projects to maximize firm value rather than private benefits, or not diverting
cash flows. We normalize the lowest effort level to 0 and its cost to C(0) = 0. At t = 1,
output q is realized.
The principal does not observe the agent’s effort, but observes the realization of
output. Output is continuously distributed according to a cumulative distribution func-
tion (“CDF”) Fθ(q|e) with a continuous probability density function (“PDF”) fθ(q|e)
that satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (“MLRP”): for any eH > eL and
any θ, fθ(q|eH)
fθ(q|eL)
is strictly increasing in q.3 Intuitively, MLRP means that higher outputs
indicate higher effort.
To ensure existence of an optimal contract, we assume that output has a finite
mean Eθ[q|e] < ∞ and the integral
∫∞
X
qfθ(q|e)dq is a continuous function of e for
each X ∈ R. Moreover, to simplify notation, we assume that the CDF Fθ(q|e) is
differentiable with respect to θ.
The parameter θ orders the precision of the output distribution in the sense of a
mean-preserving spread (“MPS”). Formally, for any θ ≥ θ′, Eθ [q|e] = Eθ′ [q|e] , and
Fθ(q|e)
{
≤
≥
}
Fθ′(q|e) for q
{
<
>
}
qe. (1)
for some qe.
4 Since a higher θ removes noise from the distribution of output without
without affecting its mean, θ represents how informative output q is about effort e.
3Note that MLRP implies first-order stochastic dominance (“FOSD”): Fθ(q|e) is strictly decreasing
in e for each fixed (θ, q). Thus, throughout the paper, we use “effort increases output” as a shorthand
for “effort improves the distribution of output in the sense of FOSD.”
4This definition follows Machina and Rothschild (2008) and states that the distributions differ
by a single MPS. This notion implies second-order stochastic dominance (“SOSD”), which allows
distributions to differ by a sequence of MPSs.
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The precision parameter θ may be chosen by the principal, or result from exogenous
changes such as a reduction in economic uncertainty. Our goal is to analyze the value
of information and its effect on incentives, which applies to either setting.5
The agent is paid a “wage” Wθ (q) and the principal receives a “profit” Rθ (q) =
q −Wθ (q). The agent is risk-neutral and so maximizes his expected wage
Eθ [Wθ (q) |e] =
∫ ∞
−∞
Wθ (q) fθ (q|e) dq,
less the cost of effort. His reservation utility is zero and there is no discounting.
Following Innes (1990), we make two assumptions on the set of feasible contracts.
First, there is a limited liability constraint on the agent:
Wθ(q) ≥ 0 ∀ q. (2)
Second, a monotonicity constraint ensures the principal’s payoff is non-decreasing in
output:
η ≥ Wθ(q + η)−Wθ(q) (3)
for all η > 0. Innes (1990) justifies this constraint on two grounds. First, if it did
not hold, the principal would have incentives to sabotage output. Second, if it did not
hold, the agent would gain more than one-for-one for increases in output. Thus, he
would have incentives to borrow on his own account to increase output.
The principal wishes the agent to exert effort level e∗, and so the contract must
satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint:
e∗ ∈ argmax
e
Eθ [Wθ (q) |e]− C(e). (4)
Following standard arguments, the participation constraint will be slack and can be
ignored in the analysis that follows. The principal is also risk-neutral and thus chooses
a contract Wθ (q) and an effort level e
∗ to maximize her expected profit Rθ (q) subject
to the limited liability (2), monotonicity (3), and incentive (4) constraints.
We discuss three features of our modeling setup. First, following Innes (1990), the
principal contracts on output q and so changes in the precision of the performance
5While we consider the effect of changing the volatility of output, Chaigneau, Edmans, and Gottlieb
(2017) derive necessary and sufficient conditions for whether the addition of a new signal has strictly
positive value under contracting constraints.
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measure change the volatility of output, as with risk management. We have also
analyzed a model in which q is non-contractible, as in Baker (1992). For example, the
principal may not have a contractible objective (e.g., a non-profit firm or government
agency, or a private firm with no traded stock); the agent may be only one employee
in a team and only the team’s output is observable (e.g., a public firm where the
employee has very little effect on the stock price); effort may contribute to a long-term
project such as R&D where, by the time verifiable output is fully realized, the agent
may no longer be with the firm; or the effort may have non-quantifiable outcomes,
such as corporate social responsibility initiatives or actions with externalities on other
divisions (see also Malenko (2016)). In this model, there is a separate signal s = q + η
on which contracts could be written. Thus, the precision of the signal s could be
affected without changing output volatility, and so this model applies to improving
monitoring technology or filtering out noise.6 All results continue to hold (because
of risk neutrality, changing the volatility of output has no effect), but the notation is
more complex due to the introduction of an additional variable. Appendix B analyzes
an alternative framework where both output q and a separate signal s are contractible,
and changes in precision change the volatility of s but not q. In the core model, since
the “signal” equals “output”, we will use these terms interchangeably.
Second, in Innes (1990), the agent offers the contract and maximizes his utility
subject to the principal’s participation constraint. Since it is the principal who will
typically invest in information, we model her as offering the contract so that she cap-
tures the surplus and thus the benefits from precision. Appendix F considers the agent
offering the contract and choosing precision. Third, while Innes (1990) assumes contin-
uous effort and the first-order approach (“FOA”), we do not impose any such structure
on effort for our most general results.
2.1 The optimal contract
This section solves for the optimal contract holding precision θ fixed. The analysis is
similar to Innes (1990). Our main results will come in Section 3, which analyzes the
gains from increasing θ.
6In that model, there is a similar justification for the monotonicity constraint (3). Rather than
borrowing on his own account to increase the signal, the agent could exert effort to manipulate the
signal. If the marginal cost of increasing the signal by 1 is µ, the contract slope will equal µ (any
greater slope will induce manipulation). Thus, all the results will hold except that the contract slope
is now µ rather than 1.
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Lemma 1 below establishes that the optimal payment to the agent Wθ (·) is a call
option on q with strike price Xθ. Alternatively, the optimal payment to the principal
Rθ (·) is risky debt with face value Xθ.
Lemma 1 (Optimal contract) For each θ, there exists an optimal contract with
Wθ(q) = max{0, q −Xθ}, (5)
Rθ (q) = min {q,Xθ} , (6)
for some Xθ.
As in Innes (1990), the intuition is as follows. The absolute value of the likelihood
ratio is highest in the tails of the distribution of q, so output is most informative about
effort in the tails. The principal cannot incentivize the agent in the left tail by giving
negative wages (due to limited liability), and so she incentivizes him in the right tail by
giving high wages. With an upper bound on the slope, the optimal contract involves
call options on q with the maximum feasible slope, i.e., ∂Wθ
∂q
(q) = 1. Since the agent’s
positive wage for high output cannot be offset by a negative wage for low output, his
expected wage Eθ [Wθ (q) |e] strictly exceeds his reservation utility of zero, and so he
enjoys rents.
Substituting the contract (5) into the incentive constraint (4), the effort that the
agent chooses when offered a contract with strike price Xθ is given by
eθ(Xθ) ∈ argmax
e
∫ ∞
Xθ
(q −Xθ)fθ(q|e)dq − C(e). (7)
In general, eθ(Xθ) may not be single-valued. Whenever this is the case, we follow the
standard approach of choosing the effort level preferred by the principal.
3 The value of information
This section calculates the value of information to the principal, by studying the effect
of changes in signal precision on the principal’s profits. Section 3.1 shows that the total
effect of precision contains both a direct and incentive effect, and provides a condition
that determines the sign of the incentive effect that holds for all output distributions.
Section 3.2 shows that, for distributions with a location parameter, the sign of the
10
incentive effect depends on the strike price of the option. Section 3.3 relates the initial
strike price of the option – and thus the incentive effect and the value of information
– to the underlying parameters of the agency problem.
3.1 The incentive effect
We initially assume that the effort function eθ (Xθ) is differentiable with respect to
θ. This is for simplicity of exposition and transparency of intuition; we drop this
assumption later.
Differentiating the principal’s expected profits with respect to precision yields:
Total Effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
d
dθ
Eθ [Rθ(q)|eθ(Xθ)] =
Direct Effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂
∂θ
Eθ [Rθ (q) |eθ(Xθ)]
+
d
dXθ
Eθ [Rθ (q) |eθ(Xθ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zero by Envelope Theorem
∂Xθ
∂θ
+
∂
∂e
Eθ [Rθ (q) |eθ(Xθ)]
∂eθ(Xθ)
∂θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive Effect
(8)
The first term is the direct effect. Holding constant the strike price and effort level, an
increase in output precision reduces the value of the agent’s optionW and increases the
principal’s expected profitR. Due to limited liability, the principal’s profit, min {q,Xθ},
is concave in q; the agent’s option, max {0, q −Xθ}, is convex in q. Since θ orders the
distribution of q in terms of SOSD, the expected profit (wage) is increasing (decreasing)
in θ. This reduction in pay is the benefit of precision highlighted by Bebchuk and Fried
(2004) in their argument that the lack of RPE is inefficient. In the Holmstrom (1979)
setting of a risk-averse agent, an increase in precision reduces the risk borne by the
agent and thus allows the principal to lower the expected wage. In our setting of risk
neutrality and limited liability, precision directly reduces the expected wage by lowering
the value of the option.
The second term is the effect of re-optimizing the strike price on profits, which is
zero by the envelope theorem – the principal had already optimized it for the initial
level of precision. The third term is the incentive effect, which arises because the
increase in precision affects the agent’s incentive to exert effort. An increase in effort
raises profits ( ∂
∂e
E [Rθ (q) |eθ(Xθ)] > 0), but whether precision increases or decreases
effort is ambiguous. Our goal is to analyze the determinants of this effect and relate
them to the underlying parameters of the agency problem.
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Even when ∂eθ(Xθ)
∂θ
< 0 and the incentive effect counteracts the direct effect, it can
never outweigh it. The total effect is always weakly negative from revealed preference:
if reducing precision reduced the principal’s profit, she would have added in randomness
to the contract, and so the initial contract would not have been optimal.
For a given contract, if the agent’s effort level increases (decreases) with precision,
we say that the incentive effect is positive (negative) and that effort and precision are
complements (substitutes). Differentiating the incentive constraint (4) with respect to
e and θ, the incentive effect is positive if and only if
∂2
∂e∂θ
Eθ [Wθ (q) |e] ≥ 0. (9)
and negative if the reverse inequality holds.
Integrating by parts, we can rewrite the agent’s expected wage as follows:
E[Wθ (q) |e, θ] = E[q|e]−Xθ +
∫ Xθ
−∞
Fθ(q|e)dq. (10)
Precision does not affect the mean output E[q|e], and effort does not affect the strike
price Xθ. Thus, only the cross-partial of the third term on the right-hand side (“RHS”)
of (10) is non-zero. Therefore, precision increases (decreases) effort, i.e., effort and
precision are complements (substitutes), if
∂2
∂θ∂e
∫ X
−∞
Fθ(q|e)dq ≥ (≤) 0 ∀e,X. (11)
We now formalize the above argument and generalize it to cases where the effort
function is not differentiable with respect to precision.7 To allow for this case, and
thus to accommodate situations where the FOA fails or the effort space is discrete,
Definition 1 replaces the derivatives that determine the total and direct effects by their
discrete counterparts. Let Π(θ) ≡ Eθ[Rθ(q)|eθ(Xθ)] denote the principal’s expected
profit when precision equals θ.
Definition 1 The incentive effect of precision is positive at θ if
Π(θ′)− Π(θ)
θ′ − θ
≥
Eθ′ [Rθ(q)|eθ(Xθ)]− Eθ[Rθ(q)|eθ(Xθ)]
θ′ − θ
(12)
7Since the envelope theorem only holds at differentiability points of the value function, the decom-
position (8) may not be well defined if the agent’s effort eθ (Xθ) is not differentiable in θ.
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for all θ′ > θ in an open neighborhood of θ, and negative at θ if
Π(θ′)− Π(θ)
θ′ − θ
≤
Eθ′ [Rθ(q)|eθ(Xθ)]− Eθ[Rθ(q)|eθ(Xθ)]
θ′ − θ
(13)
for all θ′ < θ in an open neighborhood of θ.
The left-hand side (“LHS”) of (12) and (13) corresponds to the total effect: the total
change in profits when precision changes from θ to θ′. The RHS is the direct effect: the
change in profits when when precision changes from θ to θ′ but we hold the strike price
and effort fixed. The incentive effect is the difference. Definition 1 is analogous to the
decomposition in (8), except that it considers sub- and super-gradients to incorporate
situations where eθ (Xθ) is not differentiable.
Proposition 1 generalizes the conditions in (11), for the incentive effect to be positive
and negative, without assuming a differentiable effort function:
Proposition 1 (Effect of precision on incentives) The incentive effect of precision is
positive if, for all eH > eL and all X,
∂
∂θ
∫ X
−∞
[Fθ(q|eH)− Fθ(q|eL)] dq ≥ 0. (14)
The incentive effect of precision is negative if, for all eH > eL and all X,
∂
∂θ
∫ X
−∞
[Fθ(q|eH)− Fθ(q|eL)] dq ≤ 0. (15)
Proposition 1 provides a sufficient condition for the incentive effect to be positive
that is both general and simple.8 The condition is general: it can be applied under any
output distribution and any assumption about the effort space. In particular, we do
not require the first-order approach to hold or the effort space to be an interval. The
condition is also simple and thus easy to check: while the expected wage contains several
terms (equation (10)), Proposition 1 requires us to check only one term. Appendix B
provides an analogous condition for the case in which both output and a separate signal
are contractible, and changes in precision affect the distribution of the signal rather
than output.
8Formally, condition (14) states that
∫X
−∞
Fθ(q|e) is supermodular in (e, θ), whereas (15) states
that it is submodular in (e, θ). As usual, supermodularity (submodularity) can be interpreted as e
and θ being complements (substitutes).
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Example 1 illustrates the results from Proposition 1 in a simple case where effort
has a closed-form solution:
Example 1 Suppose the cost of effort is quadratic C(e) = e
2
2
and that output belongs
to a linear distribution family (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987):
Fθ(q|e) = eF
H
θ (q) + (1− e)F
L
θ (q), e ∈ [0, 1],
where FHθ (q) and F
L
θ (q) are CDFs. In this case, we can write the agent’s optimal effort
in closed form,
eθ (X) = E[q|e = 1]− E[q|e = 0] +
∫ X
−∞
[
FHθ (q)− F
L
θ (q)
]
dq,
which allows us to obtain the conditions from Proposition 1 directly:
∂eθ (Xθ)
∂θ
=
∫ Xθ
−∞
∂
∂θ
[
FHθ (q)− F
L
θ (q)
]
dq.
3.2 The incentive effect and the strike price
Proposition 1 gives sufficient conditions for the incentive effect to be positive or negative
regardless of the strike price of the option. An important limitation, however, is that
for most distributions, ∂
∂θ
∫ X
−∞
[Fθ(q|eH)− Fθ(q|eL)] dq is positive for some values of X
and negative for other values of X, and so neither (14) nor (15) holds. In these cases,
the sign of the incentive effect will depend on the strike price. This section relates the
incentive effect to the strike price for output distributions with a location parameter.
We henceforth decompose output as follows:
q = e+ ε, (16)
where ε is continuously distributed according to a PDF gθ and CDF Gθ with full
support on an interval of the real line. Equation (16) is without loss of generality, since
we can always define “noise” ε as the difference between effort and output. In practice,
noise can result from a market or industry shock, the contribution of other agents, or
measurement error.
When output has a location parameter, the noise distribution gθ is not a function of
e: exerting effort shifts the distribution of output rightward without affecting its shape.
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As a result, distributions with a location parameter are commonly used in agency
settings; examples include the normal, uniform, logistic, and Laplace distributions.
Then, fθ(q|e) ≡ gθ(q− e) and Fθ(q|e) ≡ Gθ(q− e) denote the PDF and CDF of output
conditional on effort e. As before, we assume that effort increases output in the sense
of MLRP and that θ orders the precision of output in terms of a MPS. For distributions
with a location parameter, the former entails that, for any eH > eL and any θ,
gθ(q−eH)
gθ(q−eL)
is strictly increasing in q. The latter entails that the mean of ε is the same for all θ
and that there exists ε̂ such that
∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε)
{
≤
≥
}
0 for ε
{
<
>
}
ε̂. (17)
For tractability, we assume that the FOA is valid: the effort space is an interval and
that the agent’s incentive constraint (7) can be replaced by its first-order condition:9
d
de
Eθ [Wθ (q) |e] = C
′(e) (18)
With the FOA, the agent’s effort, implicitly defined by (18), is a differentiable function
of θ, which simplifies the analysis of the impact of θ on effort.
Proposition 2 shows that the sign of the incentive effect depends on whether the
strike price of the option is above or below a fixed threshold.
Proposition 2 (Effect of information on the strike price) Suppose the FOA is valid.
There exists X̂, independent of θ, such that:
(i) if Xθ < X̂, effort and precision are complements and the incentive effect of
precision is positive;
(ii) if Xθ > X̂, effort and precision are substitutes and the incentive effect of pre-
cision is negative.
The intuition is as follows. The agent’s marginal benefit of effort is its positive
effect on the value of his option. When output has a location parameter, an increase
in effort by one unit shifts the distribution of output by $1. Since the agent receives a
positive wage if and only if q ≥ Xθ, increasing effort only increases the wage if output
9To verify the validity of the FOA, it suffices to check that, at the strike price chosen by the
principal under this relaxed program, the agent’s payoff is a single-peaked function of effort. A
sufficient condition for the validity of FOA in our setting is supε{gθ(ε)} < infe{C
′′(e)}, which we will
assume throughout this section.
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ends up higher than the strike price – if output still ends up below the strike price, then
he receives no return for his effort. Recall that increasing precision moves probability
mass from the tails towards the center of the distribution. If Xθ is low, raising θ shifts
mass from below to above Xθ, increasing the probability that output exceeds the strike
price. On the other hand, if Xθ is high, raising θ shifts mass from above to below Xθ,
reducing the probability that output exceeds the strike price.
Importantly, the threshold is independent of θ. The threshold will depend on the
effort level that the principal wishes to implement; hypothetically, this effort level might
depend on θ. However, effort is a smooth function of θ. Since the threshold separates
the areas where effort is increasing and decreasing in θ, effort is constant in θ at the
threshold, and so the threshold is independent of θ. This independence is important
to allow us to sign the incentive effect as precision changes.10
Appendix C shows that similar results hold when the agent is risk-averse, and so the
driver of our results is limited liability, rather than risk aversion. With limited liability,
regardless of whether the agent is risk-neutral or risk-averse, the optimal contract pays
zero when output is below a threshold (regardless of the level of output) and a positive
amount, increasing in output, when output exceeds the threshold. (The only difference
is that, with risk aversion, the contract may not be linear above the threshold, and so
the contract may not be an option). Thus, regardless of the agent’s utility function, he
is only rewarded for marginal increases in output if output ends up greater than the
threshold, as only then is his wage strictly increasing in output. As a result, precision
affects incentives by affecting the likelihood that output exceeds the threshold.
3.3 The incentive effect and the cost of effort
Proposition 2 has shown that the sign of the incentive effect depends on the strike price
Xθ. This result is particularly useful since it is often difficult to solve agency models,
i.e., obtain the optimal contract and effort level as functions of the exogenous param-
eters. Proposition 2 allows us to understand the incentive effect – and in particular
the intuition for why it depends on the strike price – without fully solving for these
quantities.
One limitation is that, because the strike price Xθ is endogenous, Proposition 2 does
10For example, suppose precision increased and we observed that the strike price rose. If the original
incentive effect were negative, we can conclude that it remains negative, but we would be unable to
do so if the threshold depended on θ.
16
not relate the incentive effect to the underlying parameters of the agency problem. We
now relate the incentive effect to the cost of effort. Before doing so, we note that the
strike price Xθ reflects the strength of incentives: a lower Xθ corresponds to a higher
option delta and thus stronger incentives. Generally, the link between the strength of
incentives and the cost of effort depends on whether the implemented effort level is
endogenous or fixed (see the survey of Edmans and Gabaix (2016), Section 3.3). When
the implemented effort level is endogenous, a less convex cost of effort means that it is
cheaper to provide incentives; as a result, the principal typically induces higher effort
and raises incentives to do so (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). When the
implemented effort level is fixed, a lower cost of effort means that fewer incentives are
needed to implement this effort level.
Both the endogenous and fixed effort level may be appropriate in different circum-
stances. For example, Edmans and Gabaix (2011) show that, if the agent is a CEO
who has a multiplicative impact on firm value and the firm is large, the benefits of
effort (increased firm value) swamp the costs (increased incentives) since firm value is
much larger than the CEO’s salary. In this case, the fixed effort level corresponds to
full productive efficiency (taking all value-adding projects) and the principal wishes
to implement it regardless of the cost of effort. Moreover, a fixed effort level arises
in binary effort models, which are often used for tractability. We thus study both
frameworks, starting with the endogenous-effort model that we have analyzed thus far.
3.3.1 Endogenous effort level
When effort is endogenous, the key feature of the cost of effort function is its convex-
ity. This convexity parametrizes the severity of the agency problem: The higher the
convexity, the more rapidly the marginal cost of effort rises with the level of effort, and
so the greater the incentives the principal must provide to increase effort.
Let κ parametrize the convexity of the cost of effort, ∂
3C
∂e2∂κ
(e;κ) > 0. A typical
example is the case of quadratic costs C(e;κ) = κe
2
2
, where ∂
2C
∂e2
(e;κ) = κ. We now
index the strike price by Xθ,κ and the effort level by eθ,κ.
Proposition 3 shows that the incentive effect is positive if and only if convexity κ
is below a threshold.
Proposition 3 (Effect of cost function on incentive effect, endogenous effort) Suppose
the FOA is valid. There exists κ¯ such that the incentive effect is positive (negative) if
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κ < (>)κ¯.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. Recall that ε̂ is the inflection point of
∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε) defined in (17). If Xθ,κ−eθ,κ ≤ ε̂, precision increases incentives by moving mass
from below the strike price to above it; if Xθ,κ − eθ,κ ≥ ε̂, precision reduces incentives
by moving mass from above the strike price to below it. Thus, to determine the effect
of convexity κ on effort incentives, we must determine how it affects the difference
between the initially optimal strike price and the initially optimal effort: Xθ,κ − eθ,κ.
An increase in convexity κ directly reduces the effort chosen by the agent eθ,κ. The
effect on the optimal strike price Xθ,κ is ambiguous: since it is more costly to provide
incentives when effort costs are more convex, the principal may reduce incentives by
increasing the strike price, or she may compensate for the decrease in effort by providing
higher incentives through a lower strike price. Even if the principal chooses to reduce
the strike price, the increase in incentives is always outweighed by the direct reduction
in effort from an increase in convexity – if it were not, the principal should have chosen
a lower strike price before, when the incentive effect of doing so was higher since the
cost of effort was less convex. The proof also shows that the fall in effort exceeds any
fall in the strike price. Thus, when convexity is high, Xθ,κ − eθ,κ ≥ ε̂ and so precision
reduces incentives.
Example 2 below illustrates this intuition in a simple model that admits a closed-
form solution:
Example 2 Suppose the cost function is quadratic C(e) = κe
2
2
and that noise ε is
uniformly distributed in [−1
θ
, 1
θ
], so that ε̂ = 0. The first-order condition that determines
the agent’s effort choice yields:
e =
1− θX
2κ− θ
, (19)
and the second-order condition is satisfied as long as θ < 2κ. Suppose this inequality
holds so that the FOA is valid. Substituting (19) into the principal’s profit function
and maximizing with respect to the strike price, we obtain the optimal strike price and
effort:
X∗θ,κ =
1
θ
−
1
κ
+
θ
2κ2
, e∗θ,κ =
θ
2κ2
. (20)
Note that, while effort is always decreasing in κ, the strike price is not monotonic: it
decreases (increases) in κ if κ ≤ (≥)θ. Nevertheless, X∗θ,κ − e
∗
θ,κ =
1
θ
− 1
κ
is increasing
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in κ. Setting X∗θ,κ− e
∗
θ,κ equal to ε̂ = 0, we find that, consistent with Proposition 3, the
incentive effect is positive if κ ≤ θ and negative if κ ≥ θ.
3.3.2 Fixed effort level
We now relate the incentive effect to the cost of effort in the case of a fixed effort level.
Formally, suppose the effort space is E = {e, e¯}, where e = e (“shirking”) costs zero
and e = e (“working”) costs C > 0. The principal wishes to implement e = e.11
The incentive constraint is now
E [Wθ (q) |e]− E [Wθ (q) |e] ≥ C, (21)
and we refer to the LHS of (21) as effort incentives. Recall that, from Lemma 1, the
optimal contract is an option.
Differentiating the principal’s expected profits with respect to precision yields:
d
dθ
E [Rθ (q) |e] =
∂
∂θ
E [Rθ (q) |e]︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+
d
dXθ
E [Rθ (q) |e]
∂Xθ
∂θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
incentive effect
.
The direct effect is unchanged, but the incentive effect is different from the case
where effort is endogenous. Since effort is now fixed at e¯, the principal instead responds
to a change in precision by changing the strike price. Intuitively, when precision re-
duces effort incentives (i.e., it tightens the incentive constraint (21)), the principal
must lower the strike price to increase the delta and restore incentives (dXθ
dθ
≤ 0).
This lower strike price increases the expected wage and lowers the principal’s profit
( d
dXθ
E [Rθ (q) |e] > 0).
12 Conversely, when precision increases incentives (i.e., it relaxes
the incentive constraint), the principal can increase the strike price without violating
incentive compatibility (dXθ
dθ
≥ 0), thus reducing the expected wage. The incentive
effect is thus now the effect of precision on profits through changes in the strike price,
rather than changes in the effort level.
As in the general model of Section 3.1, the direct effect is always positive but the
11The principal wishes to implement high effort ifXθ−
∫Xθ
−∞
Fθ(q|e¯)dq ≥ E[q|e], where the strike price
Xθ is implicitly determined by the incentive constraint: E[q|e¯]−E[q|e]+
∫Xθ
−∞
[Fθ(q|e¯)− Fθ(q|e)] dq = C.
12With endogenous effort, d
dXθ
E [Rθ (q) |e] = 0: a higher strike price reduces the value of the option
and increases the expected profit, but also reduces effort and reduces the expected profit. By the
envelope theorem, these two effects cancel out. With fixed effort, the second effect does not exist.
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incentive effect is ambiguous. We again relate it to the severity of the agency problem.
With continuous effort, this severity was parametrized by the convexity of the cost
function. With binary effort, this severity is captured by the cost of effort C. Lemma
2 below shows that the strike price falls with C. Intuitively, when effort is costly, a
high option delta is needed to induce effort, which corresponds to a low strike price.
Lemma 2 (Effect of effort cost on strike price) The strike price Xθ is strictly decreas-
ing in the cost of effort C.
Recall that Proposition 2 established that the incentive effect is positive if Xθ <
X̂ and negative if Xθ > X̂ (while derived for the case of endogenous efforts, it is
straightforward to verify the result for fixed efforts). Thus, the incentive effect is
positive when the strike price is low, i.e., incentives are strong. In turn, Proposition
3 showed that, for an endogenous effort level, incentives are strong when the agency
problem is mild (the cost of effort is less convex). Lemma 2 now shows that, for a fixed
effort level, incentives are strong when the agency problem is severe (the cost of effort
C is high). Thus, the incentive effect is positive when the agency problem is severe.
Proposition 4 states this result formally.
Proposition 4 (Effect of cost function on incentive effect, fixed effort) There exists a
constant Ĉ such that, if C > (<)Ĉ, the incentive effect of precision is positive (negative)
and dXθ
dθ
> (<) 0.
While Proposition 2 guarantees that a single cutoff X̂ separates the regions where
the incentive effect is positive and negative (for continuous effort), we do not know in
general where this cutoff lies. A benefit of the fixed effort model is that, since we know
the implemented effort level, we can relate the cutoff to it. Indeed, Corollary 1 shows
that, when the distribution is symmetric (as with the normal, uniform, logistic, and
Laplace distributions), X̂ lies half-way between the expected output when the agent
works e and the expected output when he shirks e, i.e., X̂ = e+e
2
. Thus, we do not
need to solve for the optimal strike price as a function of the exogenous parameters
of the model and take derivatives with respect to θ to sign the incentive effect. It is
sufficient to observe whether the strike price is above or below the threshold e+e
2
: the
strike price is a “sufficient statistic” for the direction of the incentive effect.
Corollary 1 (Symmetric distributions) Suppose that Gθ is symmetric around zero.
Then, the incentive effect is positive (negative) if Xθ < (>)
e+e
2
.
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We now discuss the intuition using symmetric distributions in the location-scale
family, that is, output distributions with a CDF that can be written as Fσ(q|e) =
G
(
q−e
σ
)
. Examples include the normal, uniform, and logistic distributions. Such dis-
tributions clarify the intuition since precision θ can be parametrized by volatility σ = 1
θ
,
which allows us to discuss the intuition using the familiar concept of the option “vega”:
the sensitivity of its value to σ.
The agent’s effort incentives stem from the difference in the value of two options.
If he works, he receives an option-when-working worth E [Wσ (q) |e]; if he shirks, he
receives an option-when-shirking worth E [Wσ (q) |e]. His effort incentives are given by
the difference, i.e.,
E [Wσ (q) |e]− E [Wσ (q) |e] . (22)
Thus, the incentive effect of increasing volatility σ (reducing precision θ) is given by
∂
∂σ
{Eσ [W (q) |e]− Eσ [W (q) |e]}
∣∣
W (q)=Wσ(q)
. (23)
An increase in volatility raises the value of each option, because the vega of an option
is positive, but does so to different degrees since the options have different vegas. The
incentive effect of increasing volatility is thus the vega of the option-when-working,
∂
∂σ
Eσ [W (q) |e], minus that of the option-when-shirking,
∂
∂σ
Eσ [W (q) |e].
The vega of an option is highest for an at-the-money option (see Claim 1 in Ap-
pendix D13), and declines when the option moves either in- or out-of-the-money. Thus,
the vega of the option-when-working is highest at X = e and the vega of the option-
when-shirking is highest at X = e. If the initial strike price is Xσ = X̂ =
e+e
2
, both
options are out-of-the-money by e−e
2
. They thus have the same vega (see Claim 2 in
Appendix D), and so effort incentives are independent of σ. We thus have dXσ
dσ
= 0.
When Xσ < X̂, the option-when-shirking is closer to at-the-money, and so it has a
higher vega. An increase in σ raises the value of the option-when-shirking more than
the option-when-working and thus reduces effort incentives. Thus, the strike price must
be lowered to restore effort incentives, and so dXσ
dσ
< 0. When Xσ > X̂, the option-
when-working is closer to at-the-money than the option-when-shirking. An increase in
σ raises effort incentives, and so dXσ
dσ
> 0.
13It is well-known that for lognormal distributions, the vega is highest for at-the-money options (as
maturity approaches zero). Claim 1 extends this result to all distributions with a location and scale
parameter.
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Note that the LHS of (23) is related to the option’s vanna.14 The vanna of an option
is given by ∂
2
E[W ]
∂q∂σ
– the cross-partial of its value with respect to both output q and
volatility σ, or alternatively the derivative of its delta (∂E[W ]
∂q
) with respect to volatility
σ. When an option is in-the-money, its vanna is negative. Its delta – and thus the
agent’s effort incentives – decreases with volatility, and thus increase with precision:
effort and precision are complements. In contrast, when an option is out-of-the-money,
its vanna is positive, and so effort and precision are substitutes.
Graphical illustration We now demonstrate graphically the direct and incentive
effects, to illustrate the importance of taking the incentive effect into account when
calculating the value of information. We consider the common case of a normal dis-
tribution, which is symmetric. Figure 1 illustrates how the direct and incentive effects
change with the severity of the moral hazard problem (parametrized by C). As is stan-
dard for graphs of option values, the figure contains the strike price X on the x-axis;
since X is strictly decreasing in C (Lemma 2), there is a one-to-one mapping between
X and C.
To understand Figure 1, the direct effect, ∂E[Wσ(q)|e]
∂σ
, is the vega of the option-when-
working. It tends to zero as the strike price approaches either −∞ or∞, and is greatest
when the option is at-the-money, i.e., X = 1. The incentive effect, ∂E[Wσ(q)|e]
∂Xσ
dXσ
dσ
, is
positive for X < X̂ and thereafter negative; when X crosses above X̂ it becomes
increasingly negative but then returns to zero. The total effect dE[Wσ(q)|e]
dσ
combines
these effects. While the direct effect is initially increasing in X, this is outweighed by
the fact that the incentive effect is initially decreasing in X. Thus, in Figure 1, the
total gains from precision are monotonically decreasing in X.
An analysis focusing purely on the direct effect would suggest that the value of
information is greatest when the initial option is at-the-money, which corresponds to a
moderate strike price and a moderate cost of effort. In contrast, considering the total
effect shows that, for a fixed effort level, the value of information is monotonically
increasing in the severity of the agency problem. Appendix E shows analytically that
this monotonic effect is general to the normal distribution, rather than applying only
to the specific parameter values chosen in Figure 1.
14The difference is that the vanna is defined for local changes in output q, but equation (23) concerns
potentially non-local changes in effort and thus output.
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Figure 1: Total and partial derivative of expected pay with respect to σ for a range of
values of X, for e = 0, e¯ = 1, and σ = 1.
Ex ante and ex post incentives We end this section by contrasting the principal’s
ex ante and ex post incentives to invest in precision. Our analysis thus far assumes
that the principal chooses precision ex ante, i.e., before the agent chooses effort, and
can commit to this choice. She thus takes into account the effect of precision on both
the value of the agent’s option (the direct effect) and his effort (the incentive effect).
We now consider the case in which the principal cannot commit to an initial level of
precision, but instead chooses precision ex post, i.e., after the agent has exerted effort
but before output is realized. Any level of precision announced before the agent has
exerted effort is not credible as the agent will rationally anticipate that the principal
will change precision to the level that maximizes her payoff ex post, and so any pre-
announced level is irrelevant.
When precision is chosen ex post, the principal’s marginal benefit of precision cor-
responds to the direct effect only, since the strike price and the agent’s effort have
already been chosen.15 Thus, the difference between the principal’s ex ante and ex
post benefits from precision is given entirely by the incentive effect. If the incentive
15By backwards induction, the principal will select a strike price that induces the agent to work
given the precision level that he will choose ex post.
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effect is positive, the principal would choose a higher level of precision when the choice
is made ex ante than ex post. In this case, the principal would like to commit to a high
level of precision if such commitment is possible. Conversely, if the incentive effect is
negative, the principal would like to commit to a low level of precision.
4 Discussion
4.1 Applications
This section discusses applications of our results, starting with compensation contracts.
Most importantly, our results show that, when employers decide whether to increase
the precision with which they monitor agent performance, they should consider the
effect on the agent’s incentives. This effect can be positive or negative, and so the
total benefits of precision can be markedly higher or lower than an analysis focused
on the direct effect alone. For all output distributions with a location parameter, and
regardless of whether the effort level is fixed or endogenous, the incentive effect is
positive when the strike price is low. In turn, this threshold is low when the effort level
is fixed and agency problems are severe, or when the effort level is endogenous and
agency problems are mild.
Thus, the model provides guidance on where the principal should invest in preci-
sion, within a firm. For example, if the fixed effort model applies, agents with high-
powered incentives (such as CEOs) should be evaluated more precisely than those with
low-powered incentives (such as rank-and-file managers). Relatedly, the model has im-
plications for the optimality of RPE, which is costly as it involves forgoing the benefits
of pay-for-luck documented by prior research (e.g., Oyer, 2004; Axelson and Baliga,
2009; Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song, 2010; Hoffman and Pfeil, 2010; Hartman-Glaser
and He´bert, 2016). The results suggest that RPE need not be optimal, as it can reduce
effort incentives. This effect is particularly likely where incentives are low-powered to
begin with, consistent with RPE being even rarer for rank-and-file managers than for
executives.
In addition, Proposition 2 suggests that exogenous changes in volatility (see Gorm-
ley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) and De Angelis, Grullon, and Michenaud (2017) for
natural experiments) or stock market efficiency will have different effects on the incen-
tives of agents depending on the moneyness of their outstanding options. This result
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applies both within a firm and across firms. In particular, increases in precision will
lower (raise) the incentives of CEOs with out-of-the-money (in-the-money) options.
Thus, where CEOs have out-of-the-money options, firms may wish to reduce the strike
prices to restore incentives. Option repricing is documented empirically by Brenner,
Sundaram, and Yermack (2000), although they do not study if it is prompted by falls
in volatility.16 Relatedly, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) advocate out-of-the-money options
because they only reward a manager upon good performance. It is already known that
a disadvantage of such options is that they provide weaker incentives compared to in-
the-money options, due to their lower deltas; our model shows that this disadvantage
is increasing in the level of precision.
A second application is to financing contracts, where the principal (investor) receives
debt with face value of Xθ, and the entrepreneur (agent) holds equity – a call option
on firm value with a strike price equal to the face value of debt. This application is
relevant for both mature firms, and also young firms since they frequently raise debt
and the entrepreneur holds levered equity, as shown by Robb and Robinson (2014).17
Our results shed light on the investor’s incentives to reduce output volatility via risk
management. Such risk management has several interpretations: the investor can
implement risk management herself since she retains control rights on output; she
stipulates in the contract that the entrepreneur implement the above measures; or she
has a menu of projects that she can finance and thus can choose project risk. Standard
intuition would suggest that these incentives are increasing in the size of her debt claim,
and thus her value-at-risk, but this intuition ignores the effect of risk management on
effort. If the initial face value is low (Xθ < X̂), a fall in output volatility raises effort
incentives. This reinforces the direct effect of risk management, that it increases the
value of the investor’s risky debt due to its concave payoff. Thus, surprisingly, risk
management may be more valuable for firms that are some distance from bankruptcy,
and when the investor has little debt at stake. In contrast, if the initial face value is
high (Xθ > X̂), risk management reduces effort incentives, offsetting the direct effect.
16Acharya, John, and Sundaram (2000) also study the repricing of options theoretically, although
in responses to changes in the mean rather than volatility of the signal.
17This is the original interpretation of the contract in Innes (1990). In his model, the agent has
the bargaining power; under the financing interpretation of our model, the principal continues to hold
the bargaining power so that she captures the surplus and so has incentives to invest in precision.
(Appendix F analyzes the case in which the agent has bargaining power and chooses precision).
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4.2 Binding participation constraint
In the core model, the agent’s participation constraint is slack and he earns rents.
The direct effect arises because information reduces the value of the option and thus
the agent’s rents. This section considers the case in which the agent’s participation
constraint binds and so the principal must restore the value of the option (by reducing
the strike price) to maintain the agent’s participation following an increase in precision.
Even though the direct effect is fully offset by the reduction in the strike price, we will
show that the total effect of information is typically non-zero.
Now assume that the agent’s reservation utility is given by U rather than zero. As
in the core model, the optimal contract is an option,18 and so the agent’s participation
constraint is now given by∫ ∞
Xθ
(q −Xθ) fθ(q|e
∗)dq ≥ U + C(e∗). (24)
An increase in precision reduces the value of the agent’s option on the LHS of the par-
ticipation constraint (24). When the participation constraint is binding, the principal
must reduce Xθ to maintain the agent’s participation.
19 This reduction must fully off-
set the direct effect so that the participation constraint continues to hold with equality,
i.e., ∂Xθ
∂θ
must satisfy
d
dXθ
Eθ [Wθ (q) |eθ(Xθ)]
∂Xθ
∂θ
= −
∂
∂θ
Eθ [Wθ (q) |eθ(Xθ)] ,
where the RHS is the direct effect in (8). Indeed, if the effort level were fixed (e∗ = e),
the value of information to the principal would be exactly zero. Total surplus is constant
at E[q|e], since effort is constant. With a binding participation constraint, the agent’s
18The proof of Lemma 1 can be adapted by letting the initial non-option contract also satisfy the
agent’s participation constraint. Then the corresponding option contract constructed in the proof
has the same expected value as the initial non-option contract, and it leaves both the principal’s and
agent’s objective functions unchanged, since the effort level is the same. Because the agent chooses
effort optimally and can achieve the same expected utility by choosing the same effort level under the
new option contract as under the initial contract, he is better off under the option contract with the
higher effort level than under the initial contract with the initial effort level. Thus, with a binding
participation constraint, the initial non-option contract remains dominated by an option contract.
19Since the agent chooses effort optimally, we know from the envelope theorem that the total effect
of a change in Xθ on the agent’s expected utility net of effort cost is simply equal to the partial effect,
holding effort constant.
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utility is constant at U + C(e). Since the principal’s profit equals total surplus minus
the agent’s utility, it would also be constant. Intuitively, when the agent’s participation
constraint binds, precision cannot be used to reduce the cost of compensation, and so
has no value to the principal.
However, when the implemented effort level is endogenous, the value of information
is typically non-zero. The fall in the strike price required to maintain the agent’s
participation increases the option’s delta and thus effort incentives. We call this the
“participation effect”. The total value of information to the principal in (8) is now
given by:
d
dθ
Eθ [Rθ(q)|eθ(Xθ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Effect
=
∂
∂e
Eθ [Rθ (q) |eθ(Xθ)]
∂eθ(Xθ)
∂θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive Effect
+
∂
∂e
Eθ[Rθ(q)|eθ(Xθ)]
∂eθ(Xθ)
∂Xθ
∂Xθ
∂θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Participation Effect
.
(25)
There is no longer a direct effect. When the agent’s participation constraint is binding,
the value of information to the principal stems entirely from its effect on effort – it
cannot be used to reduce the agent’s rents.
The “effort effect” de
dθ
now has two components. These can be more clearly seen as
follows:
de
dθ
=
∂e
∂θ
+
∂e
∂X
∂X
∂θ
. (26)
First, as in the core model, there is the “incentive effect” ∂e
∂θ
, which can be positive
or negative depending on whether effort and precision are complements or substitutes.
Second, there is an additional “participation effect”, which is strictly positive: since
∂X
∂θ
< 0 and ∂e
∂X
< 0, ∂e
∂X
∂X
∂θ
> 0. Thus, if effort and precision are not substitutes,
the incentive effect is non-negative and so precision increases effort due to the positive
participation effect. Even if effort and precision are substitutes, effort can still rise, if
the negativity of the incentive effect is outweighed by the positivity of the participation
effect.
Note that a similar result holds if we instead assume Nash bargaining, where the
agent captures a fraction α of the total surplus. The participation effect is replaced
by a “bargaining effect”: following an increase in precision, the strike price falls to
maintain the agent’s share of total surplus, which in turn increases effort incentives.
Appendix F studies the opposite case in which the principal’s participation con-
straint binds. Specifically, the agent (entrepreneur) has full bargaining power and
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chooses precision. He raises an amount I > 0 from the principal (investor) to fund
a project which produces output q, and so the principal’s expected payoff must equal
I. There is a similar participation effect to this section, and the value of information
again stems entirely from its effect on effort, which remains (26).
In addition to demonstrating robustness, the analysis delivers two additional results.
First, the value of precision depends on the entrepreneur’s initial wealth. The amount
I can be thought of as the amount of new financing that the entrepreneur must raise,
net of his initial wealth. Thus, if wealth is low, I is high, which leads to a high face
value of debt. It is already known that this reduces effort incentives, since part of the
gains from effort go to the investor. Appendix F shows that increases in precision may
further exacerbate the incentive problems originating from low initial wealth, since the
incentive effect is then negative. In contrast, firms with abundant internal wealth have
high incentives to increase precision. Second, the level of precision will be different than
when it is chosen by the principal. The party that chooses precision internalizes the
change in effort triggered by an increase in precision only to the extent that it affects
him/her, depending on the initial contract. For example, with a low face value of debt
Xθ, the principal has close-to-safe debt and so benefits little from changes in effort,
while the agent is close to the residual claimant. Thus, the agent is affected more by
the effort effect (26) than the principal. As a result, if the effort effect is positive, he
will choose a higher level of precision. Due to these differential benefits from precision,
control rights matter – the chosen level of information depends on which party has
bargaining power and chooses precision.
4.3 Social welfare and regulation
Appendix G analyzes the effect of precision on social welfare and, in particular, whether
the principal overinvests or underinvests relative to the social optimum. Total surplus
depends only on effort; the wage is a pure transfer from the principal to the agent with
no effect on total surplus. Since the principal does not take the agent’s utility into
account when choosing the level of precision, she typically does not choose the socially
optimal level. This has implications for the optimality of regulation.
For example, when effort is fixed, total surplus is independent of precision. Never-
theless, the principal has an incentive to increase precision to reduce the agent’s wage,
and so she always overinvests in precision compared to the social optimum. This result
is interesting since most regulation increases the precision of performance metrics, such
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as reporting and disclosure requirements or mandatory audits. When effort is endoge-
nous, the principal overinvests in precision relative to the social optimum whenever
precision reduces the agent’s utility and underinvests in precision whenever it increases
the agent’s utility.20
5 Conclusion
This paper uses an optimal contracting model to study the value of information – a
more precise signal of agent performance – to the principal. We show that increasing
signal precision has two effects on the principal’s profit. The first is the direct effect:
reducing signal volatility lowers the value of the agent’s option, and unambiguously
increases profit. This is the standard effect of precision considered by arguments that
information is valuable to the principal. Our paper focuses on a second, indirect effect:
reducing signal volatility changes the agent’s effort incentives. Crucially, this effect
may be negative and harm the principal – effort and precision may be substitutes –
offsetting the benefits of the direct effect.
We derive a general condition that determines whether effort and precision are
complements or substitutes, and thus the sign of the incentive effect, that holds for
any output distribution and does not assume the first-order approach. When the output
distribution has a location parameter, and the first-order approach is valid, we show
that this condition is satisfied – precision increases incentives – if and only if the strike
price of the option is low. We then relate the strike price of the option – and thus
the incentive effect of effort – to the underlying parameters of the agency problem, to
determine the conditions under which information is most valuable to the principal.
When the effort level is endogenous, the principal will choose a low effort level and thus
a high strike price (relative to this effort level) when the cost of effort is sufficiently
convex – i.e., the agency problem is severe – as then incentive provision is difficult.
When the effort level is fixed, as may be the case for CEOs of large firms, the strike
price is high when the cost of effort is low – i.e., the agency problem is mild – as then
weak incentives are needed to implement the fixed effort level.
In a compensation setting, our results have implications for the situations in which
20Unlike in the fixed effort case, it is possible for an increase in precision to augment the agent’s
utility. This may occur if it optimal for the principal to significantly reduce the strike price to
implement a higher effort level.
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information on agent performance is most valuable, and how firms should recontract
in response to changes in the signal precision. In a financing setting, they have impli-
cations for the value of risk management. In particular, the incentives to manage risk
may, surprisingly, be high when the face value of debt is low. Even though the investor
has little skin in the game, risk management is especially valuable due to its positive
effect on the agent’s incentives.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof adopts Lemma 1 from Matthews (2001) to a setting with a continuum of
signals and general supports. Let (W ∗, e∗) be a feasible contract and consider the
option contract WO = max{0, q −X} where the strike price X is chosen so that both
contracts have the same expected payment under effort e∗:∫ ∞
−∞
W ∗(q)f(q|e∗)dq =
∫ ∞
−∞
WO(q)f(q|e∗)dq. (27)
It is straightforward to show that the contract WO exists and is unique. We will show
that replacing W ∗ by WO increases effort and raises the principal’s expected profit.
Let eO be an optimal effort for the agent when he is offered the option contract:
eO ∈ argmax
e∈E
∫ ∞
−∞
WO(q)f(q|e)dq − C(e).
Since the agent chooses e∗ when offered W ∗ and eO when offered WO, we must have:∫ ∞
−∞
WO(q)f(q|eO)dq − C(eO) ≥
∫ ∞
−∞
WO(q)f(q|e∗)dq − C(e∗),
∫ ∞
−∞
W ∗(q)f(q|e∗)dq − C(e∗) ≥
∫ ∞
−∞
W ∗(q)f(q|eO)dq − C(eO).
Combining these two inequalities, we obtain∫ ∞
−∞
[
WO(q)−W ∗(q)
] [
f(q|eO)− f(q|e∗)
]
dq ≥ 0. (28)
Since both contracts have the same expected value under effort e∗ and the option
contract pays the lowest feasible amount for q < X and has the highest possible slope
for q > X, there exists q¯ ≥ X such that
WO(q)
{
≤
≥
}
W ∗(q) for all q
{
≤
≥
}
q¯. (29)
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We will now show by contradiction that e∗ ≤ eO. Suppose that e∗ > eO. Then:
0 ≤
∫∞
−∞
[
WO(q)−W ∗(q)
] [
f(q|eO)
f(q|e∗)
− 1
]
f(q|e∗)dq
=
∫∞
−∞
[
WO(q)−W ∗(q)
]
f(q|eO)
f(q|e∗)
f(q|e∗)dq −
∫ ∞
−∞
[
WO(q)−W ∗(q)
]
f(q|e∗)dq︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
=
∫ q¯
−∞
[
WO(q)−W ∗(q)
]
f(q|eO)
f(q|e∗)
f(q|e∗)dq +
∫∞
q¯
[
WO(q)−W ∗(q)
]
f(q|eO)
f(q|e∗)
f(q|e∗)dq
<
∫ q¯
−∞
[
WO(q)−W ∗(q)
]
f(q¯|eO)
f(q¯|e∗)
f(q|e∗)dq +
∫∞
q¯
[
WO(q)−W ∗(q)
]
f(q¯|eO)
f(q¯|e∗)
f(q|e∗)dq
= f(q¯|e
O)
f(q¯|e∗)
∫∞
−∞
[
WO(q)−W ∗(q)
]
f(q|e∗)dq = 0
where the first line divides and multiplies the expression inside the integral in (28) by
f(q|e∗), the second line adds a term that equals zero (from (27)), the third line splits
the integral between outputs lower and higher than q¯, and the fourth line uses MLRP
and (29). These inequalities give us a contradiction (0 < 0), showing that e∗ ≤ eO.
To conclude the proof, we need to show that the principal’s profits from offering
the option contract (WO, eO) are higher than with the original contract (W ∗, e∗):∫ [
q −WO (q)
]
f
(
q|eO
)
dq ≥
∫
[q −W ∗ (q)] f (q|e∗) dq.
Subtracting
∫ [
q −WO (q)
]
f (q|e∗) dq from both sides, gives:∫ [
q −WO (q)
] [
f
(
q|eO
)
− f (q|e∗)
]
dq ≥
∫ [
WO (q)−W ∗ (q)
]
f (q|e∗) dq = 0,
where the expression on the RHS equals zero by (27). Rearranging this expression, it
follows that the principal profits from the replacement if∫ [
q −WO (q)
]
f
(
q|eO
)
dq ≥
∫ [
q −WO (q)
]
f (q|e∗) dq,
which is true because q−WO(q) = min{q,X} is an increasing function of q and f(q|eO)
first-order stochastically dominates f(q|e∗) (eO ≥ e∗ and FOSD is implied by MLRP).
Proof of Proposition 1
We start with two auxiliary lemmas that will be useful for the main proof. Lemmas 3
and 4 show that the incentive effect is positive if eθ (Xθ) is increasing in θ and negative
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if eθ (Xθ) is decreasing in θ. The principal’s program is:
V (θ) ≡ max
Xθ
R(Xθ, θ), (30)
where R(Xθ, θ) ≡ Xθ −
∫ Xθ
−∞
Fθ(q|eθ(Xθ))dq. Let X
∗
θ ∈ argmaxXθ R(Xθ, θ).
Lemma 3 Suppose eθ (X) is a non-decreasing function of θ at X = X
∗
θ in an interval
[θ, θ +∆). Then,
V (θ′)− V (θ)
θ′ − θ
≥ −
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
[Fθ′(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))− Fθ(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))] dq
θ′ − θ
(31)
for all θ′ ∈ [θ, θ + ∆). Moreover, if V (θ) is right-hand differentiable, then V ′(θ+) ≥
−
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
∂Fθ
∂θ
(q|eθ(X
∗
θ ))dq.
Proof. Since X∗θ is solution of program (30), V (θ
′) ≥ R(X∗θ , θ
′) and V (θ) = R(X∗θ , θ).
Therefore, for any θ′ > θ,
V (θ′)− V (θ)
θ′ − θ
≥
R(X∗θ , θ
′)−R(X∗θ , θ)
θ′ − θ
. (32)
Substituting the expression for R, we have
R(X∗θ , θ
′)−R(X∗θ , θ) =
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
[Fθ(q|eθ(X
∗
θ ))− Fθ′(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))] dq
=
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
Fθ(q|eθ(X∗θ ))− Fθ(q|eθ′(X∗θ ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+Fθ(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))− Fθ′(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))
 dq
≥ −
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
[Fθ′(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))− Fθ(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))] dq,
where the inequality used the fact that Fθ(q|e) is decreasing in e (FOSD) and eθ(X
∗
θ ) ≤
eθ′(X
∗
θ ). Substituting back in (32), establishes (31). For the second claim, take the
limit as θ′ ց θ.
Lemma 4 Suppose eθ (X) is a non-increasing function of θ at X = X
∗
θ in an interval
(θ −∆, θ]. Then,
V (θ′)− V (θ)
θ′ − θ
≤ −
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
[Fθ(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))− Fθ′(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))] dq
θ′ − θ
(33)
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for all θ′ ∈ (θ − ∆, θ]. Moreover, if V (θ) is left-hand differentiable, then V ′(θ−) ≤
−
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
∂Fθ
∂θ
(q|eθ(X
∗
θ ))dq.
Proof. Since X∗θ solves the maximization program in (30), V (θ
′) ≥ R(X∗θ , θ
′) and
V (θ) = R(X∗θ , θ). Therefore, for any θ
′ < θ,
V (θ′)− V (θ)
θ′ − θ
≤
R(X∗θ , θ
′)−R(X∗θ , θ)
θ′ − θ
. (34)
From the definition of R, we have
R(X∗θ , θ
′)−R(X∗θ , θ) =
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
[Fθ(q|eθ(X
∗
θ ))− Fθ′(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))] dq
=
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
Fθ(q|eθ(X∗θ ))− Fθ(q|eθ′(X∗θ ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+Fθ(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))− Fθ′(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))
 dq
≥ −
∫ X∗
θ
−∞
[Fθ(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))− Fθ′(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ ))] dq
,
where we used FOSD and eθ′(X) ≥ eθ (Xθ) to establish that Fθ(q|eθ(X
∗
θ )) ≥ Fθ(q|eθ′(X
∗
θ )).
Substituting in (34), establishes (33). The second claim takes the limit as θ′ ր θ.
The full proof of Proposition 1 now follows. The agent’s best-response correspon-
dence is
eθ (Xθ) ≡ argmax
e
∫ ∞
Xθ
(q −Xθ)fθ(q|e)dq − C(e). (35)
By the maximum theorem, eθ (Xθ) is non-empty and compact-valued. Recall that the
agent chooses the effort preferred by the principal whenever eθ (Xθ) is not single-valued.
We now show that the principal will strictly prefer the highest one. To see this, recall
from (10) that expected wage can be written:
E[Wθ (q) |e, θ] = E[q|e]−Xθ +
∫ Xθ
−∞
Fθ(q|e)dq. (36)
Suppose the agent is indifferent between efforts eH > eL. Then,
E[q|eH ]− E[q|eL] =
∫ Xθ
−∞
[Fθ(q|eL)− Fθ(q|eH)] dq + C(eH)− C(eL) > 0,
where the inequality follows from eH > eL, C
′ > 0, and FOSD. Using this inequality,
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we obtain
Eθ[Rθ (q) |eH ] = Xθ −
∫ Xθ
−∞
Fθ(q|eH)dq > Xθ −
∫ Xθ
−∞
Fθ(q|eL)dq = Eθ[Rθ (q) |eL],
showing that the principal has a higher profit under eH than under eL.
Using the expression for the agent’s wage from (36), the agent’s effort is the largest
element of
argmax
e
E[q|e]−Xθ +
∫ Xθ
−∞
Fθ(q|e)dq − C(e).
The result then follows from Topkis’s theorem, since the objective function satisfies
increasing (decreasing) differences if ∂
2
∂θ∂e
[∫ X
−∞
Fθ(q|e)dq
]
≥ (≤)0 for all e,X.
Proof of Proposition 2
With a location parameter, Fθ(q|e) ≡ Gθ(ε). Plugging this into (10) yields
Eθ [Wθ (q) |e] = E[q|e]−Xθ +
∫ Xθ−e
−∞
Gθ(ε)dε. (37)
Maximizing with respect to effort, we can rewrite the first- and second-order conditions
as:
1−Gθ(X − eθ(X)) = C
′(eθ(X)), (38)
gθ(X − eθ(X))− C
′′(eθ(X)) < 0. (39)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (38), it follows that ∂
∂X
eθ(X) ≤ 0, and,
by MPS (∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε) ≤ (≥)0 for ε < (>)εˆ), ∂
∂θ
eθ(X) ≥ (≤)0 if X − eθ(X) < (>)ε̂. Since
limXց−∞X − eθ(X) = −∞, limXր+∞X − eθ(X) = +∞, and X − eθ(X) is a strictly
increasing and continuous function of X, if follows that there exists a unique X̂θ that
solves
X̂θ − eθ(X̂θ) = ε̂. (40)
Totally differentiating (40), gives:
dX̂θ
dθ
[
1−
∂eθ
∂X
(X̂θ)
]
=
∂eθ
∂θ
(X̂θ).
Since ∂eθ
∂X
(X̂θ) ≤ 0 and
∂eθ
∂θ
(X̂θ) = 0, it follows that
dX̂θ
dθ
= 0, and so X̂θ is constant in θ.
Proof of Proposition 3
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The agent’s expected payoff equals:
E[W (q)|e, θ]− C(e;κ) = e−X +
∫ X−e
−∞
Gθ(ε)dε− C(e;κ),
so the agent’s optimal effort is given by the following first-order condition:
1−Gθ(X − e)−
∂C
∂e
(e;κ) = 0.
The principal’s profits equal
X −
∫ X−eθ,κ(X)
−∞
Gθ(ǫ)dǫ.
We introduce the “distance from ε̂” variable Z ≡ X − e. As seen in the proof of
Proposition 2, for the location family, ∂eθ
∂θ
≥ (≤)0 if Z ≤ (≥)ε̂. It suffices to show that
the distance from ε̂ chosen by the principal, Z∗κ,θ = X
∗
κ,θ − e
∗
κ,θ, is increasing in κ.
We can rewrite the principal’s profits in terms of (Z, e) instead of (X, e), i.e.,
Π(Z;κ) ≡ Z + e∗θ,κ(Z)−
∫ Z
−∞
Gθ(ǫ)dǫ
where e∗θ,κ(Z) is implicitly determined by:
1−Gθ(Z)−
∂C
∂e
(e;κ) = 0.
Total differentiation of the previous equality establishes that:
∂e∗θ,κ(Z)
∂Z
= −
gθ(Z)
∂2C
∂e2
(e;κ)
< 0,
∂e∗θ,κ(Z)
∂κ
=
− ∂
2C
∂e∂κ
(e;κ)
∂2C
∂e2
(e;κ)
> 0.
Note that the principal’s profit Π(Z, κ) has increasing differences, since
∂2Π
∂Z∂κ
(Z;κ) =
gθ(Z)[
∂2C
∂e2
(e;κ)
]2 ∂3C∂e2∂κ(e;κ) > 0.
By Topkis’s theorem, the solution Z∗κ,θ = X
∗
κ,θ − e
∗
κ,θ is increasing in κ.
Proof of Lemma 2
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The agent works if the incentive constraint holds:
E[Wθ (q) |e]− E [Wθ (q) |e] ≥ C. (41)
We define Xθ implicitly by the binding incentive constraint:∫ ∞
Xθ
(q −Xθ) [fθ(q|e)− fθ(q|e)] dq = C. (42)
It is straightforward to show that Xθ exists and is unique. By the implicit function
theorem,
dXθ
dC
=
1
Fθ(Xθ|e)− Fθ(Xθ|e)
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
As discussed in the main text, the only term in the decomposition of the expected wage
(10) with a non-zero cross-partial is
∫ Xθ
−∞
Fθ(q|e)dq. Using the incentive constraint in
(21), precision and incentives are complements (substitutes) if and only if
∂
∂θ
∫ Xθ
−∞
[Fθ(q|e)− Fθ(q|e)] dq > (<)0. (43)
Since Fθ(q|e) = Gθ (q − e), we have
∂
∂θ
∫ Xθ
−∞
[Fθ (q|e)− Fθ (q|e)] dq =
∂
∂θ
{∫ Xθ−e
−∞
Gθ (ε) dε−
∫ Xθ−e
−∞
Gθ (ε) dε
}
= −
∫ Xθ−e
Xθ−e
∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε) dε. (44)
Therefore, precision and incentives are complements (substitutes) if and only if the
expression in (44) is positive (negative). In addition, using (10) we get
∂
∂Xθ
{E [Wθ(q)|e]− E [Wθ(q)|e]} =
∂
∂Xθ
∫ Xθ
−∞
[Fθ(q|e)− Fθ(q|e)] dq = Fθ(Xθ|e)−Fθ(Xθ|e),
which is negative for any Xθ by FOSD, so that incentives are decreasing in the strike
price. In sum, if precision and incentives are complements (substitutes), then Xθ
as defined in equation (42) must be increased (decreased) following a rise in θ, i.e.,
dXθ
dθ
≥ (≤)0.
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From the definitions of a MPS in (1) and of Gθ, we know that
∂Gθ
∂θ
alternates signs
only once, and ∂Gθ
∂θ
≤ ( ≥ ) 0 for q small (large) enough. Therefore, there exists X̂
such that −
∫ Xθ−e
Xθ−e
∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε) dε is nonnegative for Xθ < X̂, and nonpositive for Xθ > X̂.
In sum, precision increases incentives and dXθ
dθ
≥ 0 if Xθ < X̂, while precision decreases
incentives and dXθ
dθ
≤ 0 if Xθ > X̂. Finally, we know from Lemma 2 that the initial
strike price Xθ is decreasing in C, which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1
Recall that the strike price Xθ is implicitly defined as the solution to
e− e−
∫ X−e
X−e
Gθ(ε)dε = C.
By the implicit function theorem,
dXθ
dθ
=
∫ Xθ−e
Xθ−e
∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε)dε
Gθ(Xθ − e)−Gθ(Xθ − e)
. (45)
The denominator is negative; so dXθ
dθ
≥ (≤)0 if
∫ Xθ−e
Xθ−e
∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε) dε ≤ (≥) 0.
Since Gθ is symmetric for any θ, Gθ(ε) = 1−Gθ(−ε) for any θ, ε. In particular,
∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε) = −
∂Gθ
∂θ
(−ε).
so, by MPS, ∂Gθ
∂θ
(x) ≥ 0 ⇔ x ≥ 0.
Evaluating at Xθ =
e+e
2
, gives
∫ e−e
2
− e−e
2
∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε)dε = 0.
Note that dXθ
dθ
≤ 0 whenever X > e, since, in that case, ∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε) ≥ 0 for all ε ∈
(X − e, X − e). Similarly, ∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε) ≤ 0 whenever X < e. Finally, for e ≤ X ≤ e, we
have
d
dX
[∫ X−e
X−e
∂Gθ
∂θ
(ε)dε
]
=
∂Gθ
∂θ
(X − e)−
∂Gθ
∂θ
(X − e) ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact thatX−e ≥ 0 ≥ X−e¯ implies ∂Gθ
∂θ
(X−e) ≥ 0
and ∂Gθ
∂θ
(X − e¯) ≤ 0. Therefore, the numerator in (45) is increasing in X.
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